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salaries should have risen higher and more rapidly than they actually did duriv: the tysu's etd GUS in relation to the funds then available. This laz is ate tributed to the widespread practice of individual bar- gaining.)

In a period like the present when inffation, com- bined with decreasing federal and state support, is putting a squeeze on collese budgets, the individual bargaining on his own behalf is a pathetic figure. Furthermore, faculties must not delude themselves into thinking that the role of the departments in de- cision making can be very entensive. The funda- mental decisions atfecting budeet, stailing, salaries, conditions of employment, educational programs, and priorities are now made at a level of bureaucracy well above that of the department.

As for the faculty Senate or Academic Council, it is no more able than the departments to reach the real centers of power and authority in the university and must deal with the power structure on a secondhand basis through its agents and Messengers. The tradi- tional Academic Council has no legal basis for its existence outside of the policies of the university and hence exists on the sulterance of the power structure.

Since the Academic Council has no elfective machin- ery for the enforcement of its “decisions” When the governing board and administration are unwilling to accept them, its “actions” are little more than recom- mendations that can be ignored or rejected by the university power structure. Lacking an adequate finan- cial base or source of outside resources and support, the Council 1s uliimately unable to require tne power Structure to deal seriously with its proposals.

In sum, the Academic Council or Senate is all too often a device by which faculties are given the ap- pearance of democratic participation in the decision- making process without its substance. i

No more effective today are these traditional methods employed by the American Association of University Protessors:

e The proclamation of abstract principles of aca- demic freedorn and tenure

¢ The admonishment of university administrations to follow the procedures enunciated by the AAUP

¢ The public denunciation of universities that vio- late its principles

e The rating of universities according to the salaries they pay.

Industrial management is not susceptible to moral suasions. Its function is to eet the most tor the least— Whether in selling a product or emploving a stall. This is not a evnival statement: it is a fact of dite.

The manaverial bureaucracy is Immune to pleas of humanity, decency, democracy, or academic freedom. It iscequally inunune to sanctions that are not backed by the power of entorcement. Unir ersity manase- ment is wellawre that the ceneral public couldn't care less about what the ANUP Vor any other orsani- zation) that Tier Know that, siven) the Ptesent condition ol the market, professional sanctions cannot hurt thera,

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teenie Gee lshoil proven inadequate to cope with the centralized power Structure of the modern university. We must, there- fore, look elsewhere for an elfective vehicle for faculty participation in the decision-making process.

Let us begin with the premise that centralized power can only be met by a balance of power at its own level. Obviously, faced with the power ot the Modern university anc its managerial class, individu- als must organize in order to counter this power With the collective power of their own organization.

If an effective faculty organization is the vehicle for faculty power, the instrument by which the power can be etlectively utilized is collective This is because authority is not shared between imen Who are inherently unequal. Only when men or sroups of men deal with each other as equals is authority really shared. Those who possess power share auttior- ity only with others who possess power and know its uses. Governors, legislators, trustees, and college presidents are such men. They will share authority only with those who have the power and the means to make them share it. Collective bargaining is that means.

As Professor Donald Wollett of the University of California at Davis points out: “Collective bargain- ing is the only effective instrument by which facul- ties can achieve genuine shared authority, because it is that which makes the faculty—through its duly elected bargaining agent—equal under the law with the academic power struciure. Ti is ing table—and only at the bargaining table—that they can achieve that equality.”

What then is collective bargaining? It is a svstem of Shared authority based on a process of bilateral decision making between two avents (e.g, the uni- versity and the faculty organization), utilizing lecally established procedures for reaching mutual ment. Thus, collective bargaining provides the basis for the first really effective instrument. of faculty power and participation in the decision-making proc- ess, because for the first time, faculty is able— through its bargaining agent at the bargaining table— to come to grips with the real decision-making authority of the university.

The. resulting written agreement or contract is a legal document entorceable at law. But it is more than that. The collective bar: ANNs agreement establishes a code of governance for the univ ersity In whieh tae policies and rules athe ling the facultw are clearly de- fined. Ft also establiches procedures to resuiate the relations between che faculty amd the university adtministration--procedures desizned to protect the Vights of faculty members avainst arbitrary Ma eit. pricious action id to resolve any might arise beuveen faculty and In sum, the master apreement is the charter ol lit stitutional democracy.

—Donald Keek, associate director, Hialter Budiecit- tion, NEA.

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