Story behind a war story By F. H. SOWARD First, I salute Douglas College’s Barry Leach for being — to my knowledge — the first social scientist in British Columbia to have a book published by the prestigious Clarendon Press. When the Oxford University Press so designates one of its publications it implies that they regard it as of special scholarly significance. Accordingly it receives the best of treatment: from handsome end paper plates, and charts, to placing the footnotes at the bottom of each page and six appendices and 11 pages of bibliography. The result is a monog- raph which should long remain the best study of the — subject. Behind this book there’s another story. While still a teen-ager in England, Leach became fascinated by GERMAN STRATEGY AGAINST RUSSIA. 1939-1941 By Barry Leach. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. $17.65. military history. He struck up correspondence with a senior German general, who was then a British prisoner of war. -The young interrogator’s questions so impressed the general that they kept up a correspondence for two years. Subsequently, Leach became an officer in the British army in Germany, where he had much more opportun- ity to initiate discussions with survivors of the war in Russia. Colonel Sless encouraged him to make use of the information gleaned ‘‘for an operational study of the German campaign in Russia for use at Staff College.” Leach left the army, settled in B.C. and became a graduate student at the University of B.C., where he was encouraged to take — as his thesis — German leadership in the Second World War with particular reference to German strategy and Hitler’s policies in the East. /$. 1iQi Ae nnn: KA ARCHIVES I had the pleasure of chairing the oral which recom- mended him for the PhD. Several years later, after further research, this book was completed. The relatively brief monograph — of less than 250 pages — is well-organized and clearly written. It an- swers convincingly four questions: Did Hitler follow a great preconceived plan? Why did he decide to invade Russia before ending the war against Britain? What role did the German military leaders play in planning the invasion of Russia? Why did the blitzkrieg fail in tussia? Obviously, the book will be of particular interest to military history buffs and students of Hitler but, if oth- ers are willing to make the effort, they will find it emi- nently worthwhile. Operation Barbarossa, as it was grandiosely called began on June 22, 1941, when 3 million German soldiers launched the invasion of Russia. They were supported by contingents from at least eight other countries but only the Finns were taken seriously. The plan of campaign has ever since been the subject of controversy; with German generals mainly blaming Hitler for the eventual failure. Leach concedes the validity of some of these charges but strongly condemns the high command for its blun- ders. ‘“‘The most remarkable features of the German army leaders’ role in the planning for the East was not their willingness and optimism, but their inefficiency and errors.” Their intelligence was faulty, their logistics were faulty, they underestimated the effect of purges on the Soviet army and grossly underestimated its industrial base. Above all, they failed to appreciate the nature of Rus- sia itself. The Russians stoically endured fearful losses and more than 2.5 million prisoners taken in two battles. But they never broke. By the end of 1941, neither Moscow nor Leningrad had fallen. The German commander-in-chief resigned, four field-marshals had either retired in broken health or had resigned or been fired. Three other generals in command of armies had retired. Hitler had lost the war. F. H. Soward is dean emeritus of graduate studies at the University of B.C.