‘Thursday, February 16, 19 84. ane In the latter part of 1983 two events occurred which changed the nature and pos- sibly the balance of the Cold By Rod Neufeld War between the Western industrialized ‘‘free’’ na- tions, represented in greater part by the USA, and the “‘unfree’’ Soviet Union: the deployments-~of- the Ameri- can ground launched “Cruise Missile’’ system, a.k.a. General Dynamics BGM-109G, and the Per- shing II, a.k.a. Martin Mari- ' etta Pershing Short Range Battlefield Support Missile System, in European NATO bases. The stated major purpose of each ‘missile type: to improve NATO’s intermediate-range theater nuclear weapons stockpile by providing weapons sys- tems with much-improved accuracy and less vulnera- bility to Soviet first strike and also, in the case of the Cruise, to enhance NATO’s conventional defenses a- gainst a Soviet invasion by freeing manned aircraft for use in the conventional role against moving _ targets which at present only they can attack. . Less stated than the a- bove are the so-called ‘‘first strike’’ capabilities of the weapons in question. First, the Cruise: a product of extremely advanced compu- ter and avionic technology, the BGM 109G is a small unmanned aircraft with a length, including a 200 kilo- ton warhead, of 21 feet and a diameter of one foot 8 and we re dealing . with perception, not reality 7/10 inches, two factors which provide greater diffi- culty for detection by enemy radar. The Cruise flies at an everage height of 15 meters over hostile air-space which, further complicates defense, and with its navigational devices, specifically Terrain Contour Matching (Tercom) and the projected implemen- tation of the Rockwell Col- lins Navstar Global Stellite- Based positioning system (1987), accuracy after 1740 ‘miles of flight comes within 60 feet of the target. With its 270 pound nuclear war- head, one can infer the rest. Similarly, the Pershing warhead. Basically, this al- lows for effective vaporiza- tion of even the most hard- ened Soviet missile silos and command centres. Designa- ted W86 by the US Armed Forces, this warhead has the ability (granted not a very laudable one) to penetrate over 30 metres of soil and concrete before detonation. Again, one can infer the rest. Keeping all this technolo- gy in mind (and, unfortunat- ely, in the case of the Reagan __ religious/military crusade in matter) one can employ the only weapon left to the individual: rationality. First, the Americans (and we, their loyal allies) are diligently developing wea- pons systems within the framework of a philosophy dedicated to first strike. At the crux of this strategem are twin assumptions: one, we can win a nuclear war, and two, by developing wea- pons which far outdistance Soviet products (remember, we’re dealing with percep- tion, not reality) we can scare the hell out of the Russians and they will ei- ther give up their strategy of world domination (again perception, this time Rea- gan’s) or be too afraid to try anything major. Interesting concepts. Let’s propagate them over TV and through- out the media and maybe everyone, including our so- called enemies, will believe in their authenticity. Re- member, it is 1984,.at least until radioactivity replaces our concept of time. In a first strike scenario, NATO forces, fearing a gen- eral nuclear release by the Soviet Union, will. attack Soviet nuclear strike forces in an attempt to destroy their weapons while they remain in their silos. Also, Soviet subs will be hunted down and neutralized before they can react within the setting of an all-out strike. The purpose: to undermine the Soviet Union’s capability to permanently destroy the economic and social struc- ture of America and her allies. There is, however, a weakness in this strategy, and through the use of an. example | will attempt to show that: One, our civiliza- tion cannot win a_ nuclear war, and Two a ‘‘first strike would not negate this. ‘THEOTHER PRESS During the sixties, a new class of missile systems came into being: the anti- ballistic missile system, or ABM. In short, this wonder weapon enabled the user to destroy, annihilate, kaput, kill, vaporize etc. an oncom- ing ICBM whose motives were less than honorable, by meeting and_ neutralizing the intruder far out in space. The ABM’s_ (Sprint Spartan) were slim our civilization cannot win anuclear war sleek, carried a _ sizeable atomic warhead, and could form a_ protective ring around cities. Once the word was out, every Soviet (replace with Satan) Satan) - tearing Senator, House Rep, and virtually red-neck | war-hawk every who breathed clean US air. Needless to'Say the lobbying and pressure was _ intense and unprecedented - every- and and one wanted one (or two). In fact, demands for a massive ABM __ deployment — were many. Today, ABM deploy- ment is of a limited, rather token nature and many have even forgotten that they existed until Reagan came along with his talk of ABMs of a laser-beam type. Why? ‘ Well, a few (emphasize few) seers within isolated academic-oriented _ institu- tions simply pointed out that in order for this ABM sys- tem to be effective in the way ‘‘America’’ wished them to be effective, it would have to achieve 100 percent ‘‘kill’’ capacity. As it were, not even the most hardened hawk would claim 100 percent. In fact they wouldn’t even claim a sure 90 percent. Not being an ardent mathematician, | will leave the figure of 10 per- cent to the reader, but as before, infer. As far as that goes, one percent of ‘all the missiles.aimed at the Ameri- can population and industri- al complex is a fair kick in the behind, wouldn’t you think? | think it’s a matter of more than simple academic - interest that the same seers page 5 pointed out that 18 Soviet ICBMs landing on such min- or US points as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Bos- ton, Dallas, New Orleans, and Philadelphia would des-’ troy America. Period. This weakness within a massive ABM _ deployment is identical to the weakness of the first strike strategy. A small percentage of an all- out Soviet attack would crip- ple our society beyond. re- cognition. Reagan’s attempt to implement such a strate- gy is dangerous and potenti- ally fatal. The political ef- fects themselves will have . extremely damaging ramifi- cations for SALT, East-West relations as a whole, and world — stability. | Further- more, Soviet policy will ob- viously take a more aggres- sive slant because they will not, as one writer put it, “give up without a _ shot being fired’’, and just a few shots are all that are needed to make their point felt. And it would be felt. To use local language, ‘first strike’’ sounds super but twenty Soviet missiles are much more:than a kick in the head with a frozen mocassin. WHO NEEDS MY P33 EWOIUM SPACE 1 MODULATORZ ALL T . HAVE TODO (1S WAIT! / | DaviP MELSon| GCrayhsc/ruiccum