PAGE 10 February 1, 1985

 

 

 

The creation of the Canadian Secu-
rity Intelligence Service (June 28,
1984) has resurrected a classic con-
cern centered around the tensions
that exist between national security
and the protection of certain funda-
mental rights and freedoms guaran-
teed in a democratic society. This Act
faced several heated debates as many
members of Parliament felt that this
“Orwellian Legislation’’ [MacLean’s:
May 30, 1983] could allow ‘‘our
security service [the ability] to create
a climate in which legitimate dissent
could be regarded as subversive,’
[MacLean’s: June 6, 1983]. Another
concern that surfaced was whether or
not the government would ‘‘use the
security service to investigate, harass,
and intimidate people who are detri-
mental not to Canada’s interests, but
to those specific interests of the
government in power?’’ [MacLean’s:
June 6, 1983].

This was proposed in order to
legitimize all acts of intelligence
gathering ‘‘that the Mounties had
been accustomed to performing with-
out authorization,’ [MacLean’s: May
30, 1983]. It allows for the collection
of information regarding national se-
curity matters, in a manner in which
the Service deems as necessary. The
CSIS now possesses the power to
wiretap, bug, clandestinely enter
buildings and open’ mail upon the
receipt of warrant from a Supreme

- Court Judge. Section 12 of this Act

states:
The Service shall collect, by
investigation or otherwise, to
the extent that it is strictly
necessary, and analyze and
retain information and _ intel-
ligence respecting activities
that may on_ reasonable
grounds be suspected of con-
stituting threats to the secu-
rity of Canada and, in relation
thereto, shall report to and
advise the Government of

Canada.

This section is preceded by the
following clause which states that:
“Nothing in this act restricts the
Service from remaining informed a-
bout the political, economic and social
environment within Canada and mat-
ters affecting that environment.’’ This
clause extends the Service’s powers of
intelligence gathering beyond the
realm of national security. The above
mentioned clause was also included as
a protection device, due to the lesson
learned by the Canadian government
and the RCMP during the October
Crisis.

The McDonald Commission of In-
quiry Concerning Certain Activities of
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
concluded that during the October
Crisis, authorities were unprepared
and that they failed to obtain intelli-
gence on the movements and the
directives of the FLQ until after the
kidnapping of James Cross and Pierre
Laporte. It was argued by the Com-
mission that had the RCMP been
allowed to covertly investigate this

- movement, the actions of theft, arson,

wire-tapping and mail-opening would
either not have been necessary or as
severe.

This Royal Commission, headed by

CSIS: Presenting Big Br

Alberta Supreme Court Judge David
McDonald, concluded that as many as
200 RCMP Security agents operated
outside the law, committing such
possible unlawful acts as mail-open-
ing, theft and arson, during the years

| wonder when they (federal
authorities) have ever said it
was too much work to pros-
ecute civilian wrongdoers...
What a democracy has to
insist upon is that there be a

 

 

 
 
 
 
 

 

 

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surrounding the October Crisis in the
1970's. Justice Minister Mark
MacGuigan in a statement released
early in September 1983, stated:
“that it would simply not be practical
to prosecute the Mounties now.’’
[MacLean’s: September 5, 1983] He
went on to state three main reasons
for his department’s unwillingness to
prosecute certain officers in the
RCMP:

1) The task would be immense. The
Commission recorded 865 cases of
unauthorized mail-opening as well as
several cases of unauthorized theft
and arson (the barn-burning incidents
during the October Crisis).

2) He considered it unfair to
prosecute officers whose major moti-
vation was a sincere desire to protect
the national security of Canada.

3) Many of the officers involved are
either retired or in many cases the
limitation prosecution period has ex-
pired.

Civil Libertarians were outraged at
this statement by the Justice Min-
ister. A Canadian Civil Liberties
Association spokesperson stated in
MacLean’s magazine: September 5,
1983:

single standard, not a double
standard.

The McDonald Commission ex-
pressed further concerns about cer-
tain lawless activities committed by
the RCMP and issued the following
statement regarding their duties to
the law:

The discretionary freedom
which RCMP members may
have in performing certain
police or national security
functions does not, therefore,
detract from their personal
responsibility for their con-
duct.

The CSIS is ultimately responsible
to the Canadian Government and falls
under the jurisdiction of the Solicitor-
General. This is supposed to provide a
necessary ‘check and balance’ for
abuse. Unfortunately, there is no
reason to believe that this will hold
true, in light of the various actions of
the RCMP in the past. In a study
conducted for the McDonald Com-
mission Richard French and Andre
Beliveau [The RCMP and the Man-
agement of National Security, 1979]
state:

...the RCMP has failed to
establish links within the bu-
reaucracy that would ensure
effective policy making, and
has repeatedly avoided close
cooperation with its own min-
isters, to the point where the
notion of ministerial respon-
sibility has become essentially
meaningless.

Not only did the RCMP fail in their
responsibility to Cabinet during the
October Crisis, but they failed as well
during the late 1960’s, in their
investigations of Communist infiltra-
tion on Canadian university cam-
puses.

Prime Méinister Lester Pearson
stated in a directive to the RCMP in
1963, ‘‘that there was to be no
general surveillance of people or
organizations on campuses...’’ [Free-
dom and Security Under the Law
Second Report Vol. 1, 1981] On
November 29, 1967, a directive was
given to the Security Branch of the
RCMP from a senior officer request-
ing increased surveillance on univer-
sity campuses, even though the
Pearson directive was still in effect.
His reasoning is expained:

It is not suggested that uni-
versities, per se, are involved
in conspiratorial activities dir-
ected against our democratic
system, however, it is an.
irrefutable fact that they do
exert considerable influence
on sociological issues of the
day and are, therefore ripe
targets for communist infiltra-
tion and manipulation...[Ibid]

The McDonald Commission later
found this directive to divisions a
circumvention of governmental pol-
icy. The Commission explains:

In our opinion, the procedure
described in the directive to
divisions, dated November
29, 1967, was designed to
circumvent the policy of the
government and it was_in-
accurate to claim that such
procedures complied with
government policy.

This is just one of hundreds of cases
cited by the Commission, in which an
enforcement agency took it upon
themselves to direct covert operations
in absolute contradiction to govern-
mental policy. This is an example of
the attitude of the RCMP toward the
directions given them from various
members of Cabinet. The CSIS, as
stated earlier, will have to answer to
Cabinet as well. If the past practices
of the RCMP Security Division are
any indication of what we can expect
in the future, one must begin to -
question the relative freedom allowed
the CSIS in their duties of investiga-
tive surveillance.

The Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, it has been argued, is an
effective protection device to prevent
the possible violation and abuse of
these rights. Unfortunately, when
examining court cases where the
Charter was used as a defence against
the violations of rights, the contrary
holds true. The Charter is often